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In the aftermath of the 1982 international debt crisis
economists were surprised to learn that a large part of the
borrowing of developing countries from international commercial
banks was not matched by net imports of goods and services but
instead was matched by unrecorded private capital outflows from
developing countries. A satisfactory explanation for why
residents of a country simultaneously borrow and lend on
international markets clearly calls for a model in which explains
patterns of financial intermediation rather than conventional
models for net investment opportunities in different countries.
In this paper we focus on a definition for "capital flight"
developed in Dooley (1986) and a number of theoretical models
that might help understand this measure of capital flight.
Interest in capital flight has been recently rekindled by the
resurgence of private capital inflows to developing countries
after nearly a decade of very limited capital flows. The
question is whether this is a "discovery" of emerging markets by
residents of industrial countries ora return of capital flight
by residents of the developing countries. In either case it is a
private capital inflow but if the "home bias" of portfolios of3
industrial countries really is being reduced the potential for
continued inflows seems very large. In contrast if the thome
bias" of residents of developing countries is being increased by
a reduction of capital flight claims on industrial countries the
scope for continued private inflows is quite limited. The data
seems more consistent with the second interpretation.
We are concerned with the sources of capital flight and with
the welfare consequences of capital flight in the presence of the
policy and institutional environment that gives rise to it. The
next section elaborates on the definition and estimation of
capital flight and reports estimates of capital flight from 1971-
1991 for a sample of eighty four developing countries .Section
III presents a simple public finance model to discuss the effects
of different tax treatments for resident and nonresident holders
of claims on domestic assets. Section IV analyzes capital flight
using this model and emphasizes that capital income taxation that
varies de facto by residence and source leads two—waygross
financial capital flows. The model used incorporates a welfare—
improving role for capital income taxes. The welfare
cc:lsequences of capital flight in this model are due to the
restrictions its possibility imposes on the effectiveness of
these taxes and, therefore, on the fiscal instruments for a
social welfare maximizing government.
Section V discusses the welfare effects of capital flight in4
the presence of financial market imperfections. In this case,
capital flight can lead to inefficient international allocations
of physical capital stocks. In Section VI subsidies to foreign
lenders and their contribution to capital flight are discussed.
Section VII concludes.
II. Definition and Magnitude of Capital Flight
This section briefly reviews the method suggested by Dooley
[1986, 1988] for estimating capital flight and presents some
recent estimates based on this definition. The problem is to
measure the accumulation of claims on nonresidents that are not
subject to taxation, regulation, or, in extreme circumstances,
confiscation by domestic governments. This is done by
calculating the total stock of external claims, summing recorded
claims on nonresidents less direct investments abroad using
balance of payments data, cumulated errors and omissions from the
balance of payments accounts and an estimate of the unrecorded
stock of external claims. The first part is calculated using
cumulated balance of payments data with the starting value
estimated by capitalizing investment income receipts for the
ir!tial year. Errors and omissions are included because they are
often associated with accumulations of financial claims on
nonresidents that might include unrecorded capital flows along
with many other forms of assets.
The balance of payments data are known to seriously5
underestimate the full stock of external debt using the World
Bank data (among other sources). If these data are correct, then
there must be some sort of balancing transactions that are also
underestimated. These can include any type of foreign
transaction, including imports of goods and services or purchases
of financial claims on nonresidents financed by the accumulation
of unrecorded external debt. Since the type of transaction
cannot be discerned, it is assumed that all of the unrecorded
debt increases are balanced by increases in private claims on
nonresidents unreported in the balance of payments records.
Next, the stock of claims implied by investment income
receipts and market interest rates are subtracted. This estimate
of claims is excluded because it represents the portion that
earns income reported in the balance of payments accounts,
therefore not placed outside the control of domestic authorities.
These can be considered to be the stock of external claims that
results from normal portfolio diversification motives and not
part of capital flight. Comparisons of the yield implied by
reported investment income to the accumulated external claims
from the balance of payments data and to the estimated total of
external claims are first reported in Dooley [1986] for several
major debtor countries. These estimates suggest that a
significant share of the income earned from claims on
nonresidents is not reported in the balance of payments system
and therefore is attributable to the returns to flight capital.
The difference between the estimate of total external claims by6
nonresidents excluding direct investment abroad and the estimate
of assets on which interest earnings are reported is the estimate
of capital flight intended to measure claims on nonresidents
placed outside the control of the home government. This
procedure leads to larger estimates of capital flight than of
unrecorded external debt accumulations plus errors and omissions.
Estimates of capital flight using the this definition have
been updated in Claessens and Naude (1993) and are summarized in
Figure 1. Also shown in Figure 1 is an estimate of capital
flight sometimes utilized by the World Bank. The comparison of
what Claessens and Naude call the "Dooley Measure", described
above, and the "World Bank Residual Measure" is interesting in
that the two measures are conceptually identical except for the
subtraction of gross claims for which interest income is reported
in the balance of payments in the "Dooley Measure."
It is clear that this distinction made little difference for
the quantitative measure of capital flight for this aggregate of
countries until 1990 and 1991. The dramatic reversal of capital
flight in 1990 and 1991 according to the "Dooley Measure" helps
explain the large recorded capital inflows that have dominated
recent developments in emerging markets. While many authors have
si"culated that what appear to be purchases of emerging market
assets by residents of industrial countries are in fact the
return of flight capital this is as far as we know the only
direct evidence that this is the case.
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two measures reflects the fact that reported investment income
about doubled in 1991 as compared to 1989 while interest rates on
dollar denominated instruments fell by about thirty percent. Our
interpretation of this data is that residents of developing
countries have sold off their capital flight positions in order
to purchase domestic—currency denominated assets in their hone
countries. This is incorrectly recorded as an increase in
liabilities to nonresidents in the developing country's balance
of payments. The correct entry would be a reduction of private
resident's claims on nonresidents. About half of this inflow has
been offset by official exchange market intervention or an
increase in official claims on nonresidents. Since the interest
income on official reserves is recorded in the balance of
payments the "Dooley Measure" correctly captures the decline in
the stock of private flight capital. Moreover, the magnitude of
the reversal of capital flight in 1990—1991 is greater than OECD
estimates of all private borrowing by non—OECD countries on
international capital markets. While interesting in themselves
these data tell us nothing about the motivation behind two way
capital flows that have dominated international financial markets
for the past twenty years. We turn to alternative models of
international financial intermediation in the following sections.
Section III
The analytical framework for capital flight developed in8
this section emphasizes the role of policies adopted by the
domestic government and the opportunity of residents to avoid the
impact of those policies on the net income from their asset
holdings. The treatment of resident and of nonresident holders
of claims on domestic assets is often different. As a
consequence, capital flight and external capital inflows can be
seen as an outcome of international arbitrage of domestic
policies. The types of policies that can lead to capital flight
include a large variety of taxes on and subsidies to domestic
asset earnings, including outright confiscation, that vary by
residence of the investor in practice. These can be explicit
capital income taxes, restrictions on the menu of assets
available to residents different from those available to
nonresidents and subsidies, including contingent ones, to
investment by nonresidents.
The effective taxation of capital income frequently varies
both by its source and by the residence of its recipient. In
many cases, the total tax burden on capital income faced by
domestic investors exceeds that for foreign holders of domestic
claims. When residents hold assets beyond the reach of their
home government, they will tend to realize higher risk-adjusted
post—tax returns for claims on nonresidents than for domestic
assets. Under these circumstances, foreign creditors can have an
incentive to invest in domestic assets when residents do not.
Such differences in effective rates of taxation of asset income9
will lead to gross capital outflows and inflows that are
unrecorded in balance of payments data exceeding any net capital
flow.
It is often much more difficult to avoid paying residence-
based capital income taxes on income earned from domestic assets
than from claims on nonresidents unreported to domestic fiscal
authorities. Such taxes become both residence and source—based,
de facto applying only to domestic capital income earned by
residents. The taxes that can lead to differential burdens for
residents and foreign holders of domestic claims may be
anticipated rather than statutory. For example, in many cases
residents are only able to hold deposits in the domestic banking
system denominated in the domestic currency and subject to a
reserve requirement, while foreign investors can acquire claims
on domestic intermediaries denominated in foreign currency that
do not require the holding of non—interest bearing reserves.
Resident savers usually receive less than market interest on
reserves and face potential inflation taxes on these deposits, so
that nonresidents receive a higher anticipated post-tax rate of
return for claims on domestic capital.
More generally, when residents do not have access to the
same range of domestic financial instruments as do nonresidents,
the contingent taxes imposed by and subsidies provided by
domestic authorities differ for the two types of creditors. For10
example, external debt may be denominated in foreign currency
while domestic deposits may only be available denominated in
local currency. Nonresidents can purchase an asset yielding a
different distribution of returns than residents can.As a
consequence, the risks and returns associated with domestic
claims differ by the residence of the investor. This leads to
international portfolio diversification, but not capital flight
by. itself, Capital flight arises when residents avoid
anticipated taxation of domestic deposits (for example, through
inflation) and of. the gross earnings on reported foreign assets.
Acquisition of assets abroad for both groups then represents
international arbitrage of these tax rules or anticipated levies.
The extent to which residents take advantage of such
opportunities is estimated by a measurement of the claims on
nonresidents that are unreported in the balance of payments
records.
One concern over capital flight is that private external
debts are socialized or the payments on these debts are
subsidized by the government. These can lead to the accumulation
of private claims on nonresidents by residents that do not
provide foreign exchange earnings available to the public sector
for debt interest payments. Such subsidies, that are often
contingent liabilities for the government, provide benefits for
foreign lenders and, possibly, private domestic investors.11
These ideas can be addressed more formally in a stylized
two—period model of a small open economy with a single composite
good that can be used for private consumption, public consumption
and investment. In the first period, the country has an initial
endowment of the good, and households choose a consumption and
saving allocation. Domestic saving can be allocated to
investment in home capital or used to purchase claims on
nonresident capital earnings. External borrowing is also
possible, allowing nonresidents to acquire claims on income
produced by domestic capital. In the second period, output and
net income from investment abroad are allocated to private and
public consumption. The government provides public consumption
goods and raises revenue using non—lump—sum taxes. The
instruments available to the fiscal authority include taxes on
labor income, source—based taxes on domestic capital income and
residence—based taxes on investment income. Taxes can be levied
at positive or negative rates (subsidies).
Fiscal authorities face difficulties enforcing compliance
with taxes on foreign source income. We assume that domestic
residents are able to invest in foreign claims providing income
that is beyond the control of national authorities, therefore
untaxable in practice. The model also allows domestic capital
income paid to foreign residents to be taxed at different rates
than home source capital income paid to residents.12
Production of output requires inputs of labor and capital
using a standard concave technology, given in labor intensive
form by f(k). The household sector is represented by a single
household with the utility function
(1) U =u(c1,c2, 1) +v(g)
where c1, c2, 1 and g are the first—period consumption, second—
period consumption, leisure consumption and public goods
consumption, respectively. The initial endowment of leisure is
L. Household preferences are additively separable between public
goods and private goods consumption for simplicity.
Domestic claims on nonresidents are denoted by 3, and
foreign claims on domestic capital are denoted K. The share of
the domestic capital stock owned by residents is the difference
between K and K. Note that foreign claims on residents and
residents' claims on foreigners are gross. This model parallels
that of Razin and Sadka [1989], but they do not allow nonresident
claims on residents.
The household budget constraints in each period,
respectively, are given by
(2) c1 +B+(K-K)=y,
and
(3)c2 =B(1 +r*(l—ztr)) +(K—gf)(1 +r(l—tr)(lt5))
+wl(1 —t1)
The tax rate on capital income by residence is given by tn the13
tax rate on domestic source capital income is given by t5, and
the tax on labor income is given by t1. The rate of compliance
with residence—based capital income taxes for assets held abroad
is measured by z which takes values between zero and unity. If
it is assumed that evasion of investment income taxes is not
possible, then z is unity. When z is zero, domestic fiscal
authorities are unable to tax any of the earnings from claims on
nonresidents held by residents. The initial endowment of the
composite good is y, the wage rate is w, the domestic (pre-tax)
interest rate is r and the foreign interest rate is r* (net of
any foreign source—based taxes)
Suppose that international financial capital nobility is
unrestricted and that this country is small relative to the rest
of the world. Then foreign savings will always flow into the
domestic economy if the post—tax rate of return to foreign
capital is less than the rate of return to domestic capital after
source—based taxes. In equilibrium, the post—tax rate of return
to foreign capital, r*, must be at least as great as the post-
source—based—tax rate of return to domestic capital, (l-t5)r.
Therefore, foreign savers will only hold claims on domestic
capital if these two net rates of return are equal. If r*
exceeds (l—t5)r, then domestic residents also earn a higher
return to claims on foreign capital than on domestic capital
after source—based and residence—based taxes are imposed, so that14
the domestic capital stock would be zero1. Therefore, assuming
that the Inada conditions2 hold for f(k), we have in equilibrium
under perfect financial capital mobility that
(4)r* =(1—t5)r.
If z is less than one, then we also have that
(5)r* (1 —zti.) >(l—t5)(l
—tr)r.
Equilibrium demand for capital by the firminthe home
country is determined by equality of the marginal product of
capital and the pre—tax rate of interest:
(6)f'(k) =r.
Household optimization yields consumption demands that
depend upon the tax rates through their effects on the income and
the relative price of second—period consumption.
III. Capital Flight and the Public Finance Problem
Suppose that domestic savers are unable to avoid residence—
1 This holds forany z between zero and one as long as tr is
non—negative. It also holds for a residence—based subsidy (tr
negative) when z is one. When a subsidy is paid, z should be one
since rational savers would comply fully.
2 Theseare that f'(k) tends to infinity as k tends to zero
and f'(k) tends to zero as k tends to infinity. We also assume
that f(k) is strictly concave.15
based capital income taxes by purchasing claims on nonresidents.
In this case, the optimum for a small country social planner
choosing to maximize the welfare of the representative household
is attained financing public goods spending using a combination
of a labor income tax and a residence—based capital income tax.
In the solution the rate of source—based capital income taxation
is zero, so that the first—order condition for an optimum
(7)f'(k) =f*I(k*)
issatisfied.
the solution f or the optimal tax and public goods supply
problem when there is no issue of tax compliance is well—known.
The rates of tax imposed on labor income and on interest income
of residents are chosen so that the disutility of the last unit
of revenue raised from each is equal when both taxes are
positive. We skip elaborating this rule analytically. It should
be noted that such an equilibrium plan is not Pareto efficient if
labor supply is not perfectly elastic since all taxes are
distortionary.
How, suppose that both source—based and residence-based
taxes are available to domestic fiscal authorities but that
residents are able to avoid taxes on claims on foreign capital
earnings (z =0).In this case, any positive rate of residence-
based capital income tax implies that no domestic claims are held
by residents and all domestic capital income is paid to foreign16
claimants. In the absence of controls on financial capital
outflows, the government collects no revenue from residence—based
capital income taxes and all public consumption spending must be
financed by taxes on capital earnings that distort the
international allocation of production activities and on labor
income that distort goods consumption—leisure choices and labor
supply. Source—based taxes are assumed to be enforceable, but
these result in different marginal productivities of capital at
home and abroad. Again, the optimal tax rule is found by
straightforward maximization of representative household utility
subject to the necessary conditions for private optimization by
the household and firm and the constraint that residence-based
taxes raise no revenue.
Social welfare is reduced by the possibility of capital
flight in this model. This is because capital flight is a
consequence of the ability of households to avoid capital income
taxes levied on a residence basis. The effective marginal tax
rate on capital that can be achieved on a residence—basis is
zero. Reducing the residence—based capital income tax rate to
zero can eliminate capital flight in this model (for arbitraril.y
small transactions costs associated with the acquisition of
foreign assets) and results in no loss of tax revenue. The
restriction in the set of distortionary fiscal instruments
available to the government results in lower maximized social
welfare. Capital flight is another consequence and the channel17
through which residents escape the control of national fiscal
authorities.
It should be noted that both enforceable residence—based and
source—based capital income taxes affect the net external asset
position of the country. In general, an increase in a source-
based tax will lead to a net capital outflow, and an increase in
a residence—based tax will cause a net capital inflow. However,
with enforceable taxes of both types the net and gross capital
outflow will be equal. This is not the case when residents
cannot be effectively taxed on foreign asset earnings. In the
case of this model with no constraints on external financial
capital inflows, all domestic savings goes abroad jf tr is
positive and all domestic capital income is owed to foreign
residents. The gross outflow is much larger than the net capital
outflow, which may be positive or negative. This is because
domestic authorities can only effectively tax domestic capital
income, although at different rates for nonresident and for
resident claimants.
Given that capital flight is possible, the social welfare
maximizing government would choose to impose controls on
financial capital outflows. Such restrictions can help to
resolve the public finance problem for the government by reducing
the ability of residents to acquire assets earning income that
cannot be taxed. Imposing a complete (assuming enforceability)18
ban on the acquisition of all claims on nonresidents leads to a
domestic marginal product of capital that is no greater than the
foreign rate of interest:
(8)(1 —t5)f'(k) =r*,if K > 0, and
(1 —t5)f'(k) C r, if X =0.
The equilibrium domestic interest rate can be below the foreign
interest rate when no residence—based and source—based capital
income taxes are imposed if domestic savings areadequateto
finance all domestic capital.In this case, an appropriate
choice of the residence—based, or equivalently, source—based,
capital income tax can be made so that the marginal productivity
of capital is equal across borders.
This does not imply that if enforceable capital controls are
feasible then the potential for capital flight does not pose a
public finance problem. The optimal policy for a government that
maximizes the household's utility is to impose capital controls
at some positive level and a residence—based capital income tax
along with a positive rate of labor income tax in the general
case for this model. It will never be optimal to choose capital
income taxes that lead to the inequality
(9)f'(Ic) C r.
That is, such a government will not want to impose a source—based
or residence—based tax (with the caveat that this only applies to
residents' holdings of domestic financial assets) and level of
capital control that results in a marginal productivity of19
capital below the foreign marginal productivity of capital. If
it did, it could relax the quantitative restraint on capital
outflows and/or the rate of taxation of domestic capital income
and tax rate on labor income to reduce the home capital stock and
achieve a more efficient allocation of domestic saving and global
production.
The optimal tax and quantitative restriction on capital
outflows can lead to an equilibrium in which domestic saving and
investment are equal and the marginal productivity of domestic
capital is less than the foreign interest rate. The reason is
simply that the optimal level of public goods spending and
distortionary effect of a labor income tax with no capital
outflow imply a higher rate of taxation on domestic capital than
allowed by the restriction that f'(k) equal r*, when k equals
equilibrium domestic saving per unit of labor, Capital controls
are a second—best fiscal policy instrument to enforceable taxes
on capital income from all sources for residents in such cases.
When the optimum allows the equality
(7)f'(k) =f*I(k*)
to be satisfied, then full tax compliance and perfect capital
controls are substitutes.
IV. Preferences of Intermediaries for Investing at Home or
Abroad20
In addition to the problem for efficient revenue collection
to finance public spending programs, there can be other welfare
costs associated with capital flight induced by domestic taxes.
An important one of these may be due to preferences on the part
of intermediaries to invest in projects in their home country.
Reasons for such preferences include costly monitoring of
investors actions and possible risks associated with enforcing
contractual compliance in a foreign legal jurisdiction. It is
reasonable to think that intermediaries face lower costs of
acquiring information about a borrower's actions and appealing to
the power of the state to ensure contractual compliance when they
lend within their home country. When information is imperfect,
so that monitoring is costly, intermediaries may not invest
abroad even if the otherwise risk—adjusted expected rate of
return is higher.
In the presence of such intermediation—bias, claims on
nonresidents will tend to increase foreign capital stocks and
reduce domestic capital stocks ceteris paribus. We take a simple
model to illustrate. Suppose that foreign intermediaries require
a premium for investment returns in the small country over the
interest they are able to earn at home. In an equilibrium with
positive external inflows of financial capital, we have
*
(11)r + p =
wherep is this premium.21
Consider a special case in which domestic saving and
investment are equal and the rate of interest at home and abroad
are equal in the absence of any capital income taxes in the home
country. suppose that the domestic government now imposes a
residence—based capital income tax such that
(12) r* >(1—tr)(r* +p),
and (11) holds. This implies that capital flight occurs
according to the definition used in this paper. Imposition of
the tax reduces the domestic capital stock per worker, raising
f' (k) from r* to r* +p.If a tax rate low enough to reverse the
inequality in (12) is imposed, then we have
(13) r* (1 —tr)r,
in equilibrium, and there are no capital inflows although there
is a net capital outflow as residents acquire claims on
nonresidents.
The presence of financial market imperfections of this type
imply that capital flight, again as a consequence of domestic
policies and access to opportunities to avoid their impact on
private net asset income, has welfare implications. It leads to
an inefficient allocation of capital across countries and welfare
losses for the home country. These welfare losses arise because
domestic savers are induced to place their assets abroad to avoid
taxationby the home country. Intermediaries abroad have
different preferences over claims in the two countries than do
domesticintermediaries. This means that the supply of capital22
abroad rises with capital flight while the stock of capital at
home declines. This contrasts with the case of perfect
international capital mobility in which foreign lenders simply
took over the task of intermediating between domestic savers and
domestic investors.
One policy remedy when capital income taxation is desirable
is to impose capital controls as before. Again, in contrast with
the analysis of the previous section, imposition of a residence—
based capital income tax does not leave the domestic rate of
interest equal to the foreign rate of interest. Foreign
intermediaries will not purchase domestic claims until the
domestic pre—tax rate of interest has risen sufficiently to
overcome the additional costs of monitoring investments in
another country.
An interesting extension of this result is the case in which
domestic intermediaries do a very poor job of credit selection,
perhaps because of government controls on lending decisions. In
this case moving funds off shore might increase the effective
level of domestic investment assuming foreign intermediaries can
overcome information costs and make better investment decisions.
V. Subsidization of Foreign Lenders
Capital flight is often linked to the socialization of
private external debt or the subsidization of payments on these23
debts. This issue was raised by Diaz Alejandro [1984), who
argued that the foreign exchange earnings accruing to private
assets placed abroad were unavailable to the government that is
obliged to make interest payments to nonresidents. Private
external debt appears to have financed the accumulation of claims
on nonresidents that are placed outside the reach of domestic
governments. When these debts are subsidized, the government
bears a burden while foreign investors and the private domestic
claimant receive the benefits.
Subsidies to foreign capital inflows often take the fan of
contingent subsidies, providing insurance to nonresidents that is
unavailable to residents. Private intermediaries havefrequently
been able to borrow from abroad under explicit or implicit
government guarantees of the debts to the foreign creditors.
These guarantees can have adverse incentive effects for
investment choices by the intermediaries leading to the standard
arguments for public monitoring of investment actions by
publicly—insured intermediaries. Domestic intermediaries have an
incentive to invest in risky projects since they receive returns
only in the upper tail of the distribution for returns. In the
absence of adequate monitoring of the actions of domestic
investors, domestic savers may anticipate that domestic external
borrowing will lead to higher tax rates in the future because as
domestic intermediaries maximize their expected returns by
selecting risky projects, the value of the contingent liability24
of the government rises. Anticipated future capital income taxes
will induce capital flight if it is possible to place assets
beyond the reach of domestic authorities. Eaton [1987) presents
model based on these notions in which there are multiple
equilibria, one of which involves no capital flight and private
debt repayment and another in which there is capital flight and
private default.
The role of subsidies to foreign investors for capital
flight can be discussed in the model used to analyze the effects
of taxes on capital income accruing to residents. Subsidies
available to nonresident asset holders but not to resident
investors under perfect international financial capital mobility
will lead to an increase in the domestic capital stock and cause
all domestic savings to be placed abroad since equilibrium
requires that
(13) r* =(1+s)f'(k),
where s is the subsidy rate. By itself, this does not sufficient
to cause capital flight as defined here. Domestic residents only
have an incentive to purchase claims on nonresidents but not to
place these outside the control of the domestic government.
Subsidies differ from capital income taxes in that the
limits on the magnitude of the gross flows are different. The
gross capital outflow under perfect international capital
mobility when a capital income tax is levied only on residents is25
given by the total of domestic savings. The opportunity return
on domestic assets held by residents is less than the return to
flight capital, but the opportunity interest cost of borrowing
externally is the same as the interest received by relending. If
foreign borrowing is subsidized, then the limit on resources that
might be available for investing abroad at a net gain is the
extent to which the subsidy will be offered. That is, the extent
to which the government will subsidize borrowing from abroad to
purchase claims on nonresidents that it cannot tax. This might
be called the "extent of the government's stupidity."
Policies that subsidize, perhaps through contingent
liabilities for the government, nonresident holders of domestic
assets lead to capital flight if the subsidies allow external
debt to finance residents' purchases of claims on nonresidents
that generate income untaxable by the government. In this case,
the social cost of the subsidies is the utility reduction due to
a loss of national income equal to the total subsidy paid to
foreign lenders. There can also be domestic distributional
effects that may be of concern to policyniakers in a world with
heterogeneous households (Alesina and Tabellini 1989). It should
be noted that this process could also concern foreign investors.
As the tax base for raising the revenue needed for repayment
erodes and the likelihood that the government will realize large
contingent liabilities rises, foreign holders of domestic claims
enjoying public guarantees may anticipate renegotiation by the26
government. That is, foreign investors may realize the ability
and willingness of the government to honor these explicit or
implicit contingent commitments. Anticipating the possibility of
such capital levies, nonresidents should behave in a time
consistent fashion.
The possibility that subsidies and gaurantees generated
lending to developing countries that led up to the 1982 debt
crisis suggests that recent large private capital inflows to
developing countries might also be a caouae for concern. It
seems likely to us that once again private capital inflows are
being sustained not only by the more favorable investment climate
but also by opportunities generated by the governments of
developing countries. The form of the incentive is a little
different as compared to the external debt-capital flight pattern
that led up to the 1982 debt crisis.
But in one important respect the recent private capital
inflows are similar in that they are sustained by a contingent
claim on the government. The distinguishing feature this time is
that recent private capital inflows to developing countries have
taken the form of domestic—currency—denominated instruments
including equities, corporate bonds, bank deposits and government
securities3. This is certainly different from the dollar—
denominated, government—guaranteed, syndicated credits that
comprised the buildup in debt before 1982.
S. Gooptu, "Portfolio Investment Flows to Emerging
Markets," World Bank Working Paper, March 1993.27
In the current pattern of capital flows it is less obvious
that the government of the borrowing country has provided a
guarantee. However an jmpjjgit guarantee is provided by the
increasingly popular use of the exchange rate as an anchor for
inflationary expectations. In basing its credibility on the
maintenance of a fixed or managed exchange rate the government,
in effect, provides an exchange rate guarantee for the investor
in domestic—currency—denominated instruments.
This, of course, seems to leave the investor with a credit
risk. But in most emerging markets the government isvery likely
to provide a credit guarantee as well as the exchange rate
guarantee. In cases where international investors buy government
securities the guarantee is explicit. Commercial bank deposits
are also guaranteed especially where the deposit is denominated
in domestic currency.
Finally, even the liabilities of domestic nonfinancial
corporations carry a strong government backup. This is because
such firms are heavily indebted to the domestic banking system.
If nonresident creditors want out these firms can be expected to
ask for and receive credit from the domestic banks. To refuse to
do so would depress the market value of the banks' existing
claims on the domestic firms and call into question the solvency
of the domestic banking system.
What limits this process? As long as the developing country
central bank maintains domestic nominal interest rates at levels
above those available on similar foreign assets there is, in28
principle, no limit to the private capital inflows generated. Of
course, in reality the government's resources are limited. At
some point the market will begin to doubt the government's
ability to maintain the exchange rate peg and the negative carry
resulting from the low return earned on reserves relative to that
paid on the domestic liabilities issued in sterilized exchange
market intervention. But the scale of private capital inflows
necessary to exhaust the central bank's expected net worth can be
very large indeed.
VI. Conclusion
We define flight capital as the accumulation of claims on
nonresidents by residents that escape control of the domestic
government. Capital flight by this definition is estimated by a
calculation of gross external claims that generate income that is
not reported in the balance of payments data.
Our approach emphasizes the importance of public policies
and anticipated policies for the domestic government in the
presence of international capital mobility and possible evasion
of taxation or appropriation by the home government by domestic
savers. Capital flight represents an arbitrage of the different
treatment of resident and nonresident investors by domestic
authorities.
The policies that give rise to capital flight are
distortionary in the model presented here, but they are not29
necessarily simply undesirable. In the case of optimal public
goods supply without lump—sum taxes, a residence—based capital
income tax is part of the efficient policy if tax compliance is
perfect. the problem and social welfare losses arise because tax
avoidance (or evasion) is possible. The second—best solution
with capital controls includes residence—based taxes. Without
feasible capital controls, the residence—based capital income tax
is entirely ineffective for raising revenue under perfect
international capital mobility. In this case, the social cost of
capital flight is the welfare cost of losing a useful instrument
of fiscal policy, Capital flight can also result from the
adoption of distortionary policies that are not welfare-
improving. In these instances, it can exacerbate the welfare
losses.30
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